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Abstract. It is a common experience to be surprised by an artwork. In this
paper, I examine how and why this obvious fact matters for philosophical
aesthetics. Following recent works in psychology and philosophers such as
Davidson or Scheﬄer, we will see that surprise qualiﬁes as an emotion of
a special kind, essentially “cognitive” or “epistemic” in its nature and func-
tioning. After some preliminary considerations, I wish to hold two general
claims: the ﬁrst one will be that surprise is somehow related to aesthetic
appreciation, because it is often the ground to judge of a work’s value. The
second point will be that a functional analysis of surprise provides support
for cognitivist accounts of aesthetics. If this picture is right, surprise would
generally play an important part in aesthetic experience and should also be
seen as a paradigm to study the cognitive powers of art.
Schiele’s paintings, Proust’s novels, Gaudi’s buildings, and Schönberg’s
pieces, beyond being considered great artworks, all have at least one thing
in common. They are all very likely to surprise anybody encountering them
for the ﬁrst time. But why is that? Is this phenomenon susceptible to
philosophical analysis, and is it of any interest for aesthetics? I will try to
show in this paper that the answer to this question is a double yes.
Surprise, I take it, is a common reaction to artworks - although it does
not need to be a systematic or even a frequent one. Roughly, we can
think of three familiar scenarios: (a) an artwork may be experienced as
so provocative, original, complex, or innovative, that surprise is a reaction
to the work taken as a whole. Any of the artistic pieces cited above could
be associated with this kind of experience. (b) Surprise can also be pro-
duced by some deﬁnite and distinct part of the artwork in its relation to
the whole: thus, a coup de théâtre in a narrative or a switch and a mismatch
(in rhythm, style, tempo, volume, pitch, etc.) between two parts of a song
may produce surprise in varying degrees. (c) Eventually, an artwork may
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be experienced as surprising merely on the grounds of our prior beliefs
and expectations, and even if there is nothing very special about it. This
commonly happens as, for instance when a supposedly bad movie proves
to be entertaining after all, or when a much anticipated novel turns out
to be disappointing. It is a diﬃcult matter to clear the relations between
these sorts of surprises (and certainly, the picture could be reﬁned) or to
account for their variety in nature and degree. My aim here will be less to
provide a qualitative analysis of surprise in the arts than to account for its
functional role in aesthetic appreciation and more generally in knowledge.
In other words, instead of seeing in how many ways artworks may surprise
us, we will have to examine why and how they do so. I wish to defend two
claims: the ﬁrst one will be that surprise is linked to aesthetic appreciation
taken in a broad sense, because it provides grounds for determining the
aesthetic value of artworks. This does not mean, however, that surprise is
a necessary or suﬃcient condition for aesthetic experience or enlightened
judgment; and even less that it should be systematically praised as a proof
of aesthetic merit. I merely want to hold that the emotion of surprise has
something to do with the value we ascribe to artworks. The second claim
is that a philosophical analysis of surprise provides the ground for a cog-
nitivist account of aesthetics. According to this view or family of views,
one must recognize to artworks the capacity to produce new knowledge
and beliefs, or at least to have an impact on the epistemic life of individu-
als1. I think an analysis of surprise oﬀers a good argument to prove them
right, as will be shown. First, I will try to deﬁne surprise more accurately
and underline its essential link to belief and other epistemic states. In the
second part, I will consider several arguments to show there could be a
correlation between the aesthetic value of an artwork and its capacity to
surprise us. To ﬁnish, I will show why surprise can be seen as a support for
aesthetic cognitivism, and consider answer to a few possible objections.
1 See for instance Beardsmore 1971, Elgin & Goodman 1988, Novitz 1987, Nussbaum
1990, Scheﬄer 1997, Walton 1990.
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1. Deﬁning Surprise
What, exactly, is surprise? It is undoubtedly a kind of emotion, consist-
ing in the individual’s response to some event experienced as unexpected,
puzzling, or extraordinary. Surprise is thus felt as a reaction that one can
identify by diﬀerent physiological (eyebrows and jaw movements, dilation
of the pupil, muscular contractions) and psychological (feeling of shock, puz-
zlement, fear, joy) signs2. This emotion can obviously vary in intensity,
going from the lightest puzzlement to the most extreme sort of shock or
amazement. Psychologists have also remarked that surprise has no valence,
which means it can be experienced as pleasant or unpleasant (surely, we
can have bad surprises). If surprise has been of interest for philosophers
and psychologists, this is also -and especially- because of its relation with
other cognitive processes. There is no doubt, indeed, that surprise has
some kind of epistemic grounding, or, to put it otherwise, that it relies on
beliefs and knowledge for its proper functioning. If, as we said, our feel-
ing surprised results from facing something unexpected, this necessarily
implies that some prior expectation or belief was there in the ﬁrst place.
This link between surprise and other epistemic states has been made clear
by Davidson:
“Suppose I believe there is a coin in my pocket. I empty my pocket
and ﬁnd no coin. I am surprised. Clearly enough I could not be sur-
prised (though I could be startled) if I did not have beliefs in the
ﬁrst place. And perhaps it is equally clear that having a belief, at
least one of the sort I have taken for my example, entails the possi-
bility of surprise. If I believe I have a coin in my pocket, something
might happen that would change my mind. But surprise involves a
further step. It is not enough that I ﬁrst believe there is a coin in my
pocket, and after emptying my pocket I no longer have this belief.
Surprise requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I did
believe and what I come to believe. Such awareness, however, is a
belief about a belief: if I am surprised, then among other things I
come to believe my original belief was false. I do not need to insist
that every case of surprise involves a belief that a prior belief was
2 See Darwin 1872; Bain, Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954; Izard, Meyer & Niepel,
1994; Schützwohl, 1998, Huron 2008.
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false (though I am inclined to think so). What I do want to claim is
that one cannot have a general stock of beliefs of the sort necessary
for having any beliefs at all without being subject to surprises that
involve beliefs about the correctness of one’s own beliefs. Surprise
about some things is a necessary and suﬃcient condition of thought
in general”. [Davidson, 1989: 326]
According to Davidson, surprise can generally be used as a test for ascrib-
ing beliefs and expectations to individuals. Indeed, the person surprised
to ﬁnd a coin in her pocket only feels that way because she was thinking
something diﬀerent in the ﬁrst place (e.g., assuming that the coin was in
her wallet, or that she had nothing in her pocket etc.). We could not make
sense of this emotion without supposing some kind of doxastic background ,
that is, without the individual having some prior opinion, expectation, or
idea3. But Davidson shows something more. Surprise has a deeper cog-
nitive function; insofar its occurrence provokes some kind of realization
about one’s own beliefs. When my (potentially implicit) expectation to
ﬁnd a coin in my pocket turns out to be frustrated, it becomes all the more
obvious that I had such a belief, and it immediately entails a realization
about how and how much it diﬀers from what is actually the case. This is
why Davidson sees the experience of surprise as entailing: (a) some kind of
awareness about one’s own beliefs; (b) the realization of an objective state
of the world, that is, of what is or is not the case, independently of what we
previously held to be true; and (c) some kind of change in beliefs, because I
must come to realize that my previous belief was inadequate in order to be
surprised. For Davidson, thus, surprise is closely related to other notions
such as objective truth, error, and belief. The important point is to see
that surprise is an emotion of a special kind, because it is made possible
by and related to the individual’s epistemic attitudes towards the world.
It may therefore be deﬁned as a cognitive emotion, to borrow the words of
Israel Scheﬄer (2009).
A distinction, however, needs to be made: surprise is not a reaction to
mere novelty. Unprecedented phenomena constantly occur without sur-
prising us at all, as, for instance, when one goes to a new city. Certainly
3 As Daniel Dennett puts it, “surprise is only possible when it upsets belief” (Dennett,
2001: 982).
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that would not count as a kind of surprising event (unless, for some rea-
son, this situation conﬂicted with the one’s beliefs or expectations). Con-
versely, one can be surprised by ordinary and familiar facts (seeing a friend
in the street, getting six tails in a row on a coin toss, etc.). We see that
the only necessary condition in order to be surprised is to experience a
conﬂict between a genuine belief or anticipation and the current state of the
world. We can then propose the following model to account for surprise
(following Casati & Pasquinelli 2007):
Strong Expectation View
If I genuinely believe or expect that p, and event F occurs such that
:p is the case, I am surprised.
If I genuinely believe or expect that :p, and event F occurs such that
p is the case, I am surprised
This picture surely accounts for most of the cases we could think of. It
however faces one problem: we can clearly be surprised without having
speciﬁc expectations or beliefs in the ﬁrst place. For instance, I could be
surprised to receive a gift from a friend while having no prior idea that he
was going (or not going) to oﬀer me something – e.g., if it is not my birth-
day, or Christmas. In a way, genuine surprises even seem to exclude any
sort of anticipation. How are we to account for this kind of possibilities?
The answer is that the epistemic background necessary for surprise does
not always need to be explicit or even fully conscious: it might involve latent
stereotypes, habits, inductive associations, implicit inferences, probability
reasoning, etc. If we consider all these things as pertaining to our general
system of beliefs S, we can propose a second picture to account for these
problematic cases (I still follow Casati & Pasquinelli, though I modify their
account):
Weak Expectation View
If, even when I do not explicitly expect or believe that p, event F
occurs such that :p is the case and such that :p conﬂicts with my
system of beliefs S, I am surprised.
If, even when I do not expect or believe that :p, event F occurs such
that p is the case and such that F conﬂicts with my general system of
beliefs S, I am surprised.
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This reﬁned framework accounts for the no-expectation cases of surprise,
without postulating countless actual and particular entities or propositions
in the individuals’ minds that would correspond to what is negated in the
surprising experience. If we take it that we have some comprehensive,
implicit, and higher-level beliefs, we can thus account for any particular
surprising experience: it would be puzzling to see a hobbit pop out in my
living room not because I held it to be impossible for a hobbit to pop out in my
living room, but because I more generally think that nothing appears out of
thin air or that ﬁctional characters do not exist. If we accept this “layered”
view of cognition, then we can also say that surprise is experienced when a
speciﬁc situation contradicts a fundamental or common belief. My aim in
this ﬁrst part was to provide a clearer account of the nature and function-
ing of surprise. We saw that it must be deﬁned as a cognitive emotion,
consisting in the reaction to the violation of a genuine or of an implicit
belief or expectation. It is now time to see why aesthetic surprises matter.
2. Surprise and Works of Art
As we said, artworks sometimes surprise us. But is there any link between
this fact and the merits and qualities we grant them? In other words, is
surprise signiﬁcant for our appreciation of art? I will try to provide three
arguments in support of an aﬃrmative answer to this question.
(i) The ﬁrst point we can think of associates surprise with an artwork’s
functioning. It seems that surprise is necessary to the correct understand-
ing or proper experience of some works. There are certain creations specif-
ically intending to produce this emotion and we would probably fail at
grasping these works at their full value if we didn’t experience any such
feeling. By value, I simply mean the qualitative appreciation we can have of
a work, resulting from our perceptual, aﬀective, and cognitive encounter
with it. Talk about aesthetic value is certainly controversial, but we can
stick to a common usage seeing it as the sum of aesthetic merits or ﬂaws
in a work of art.
Surprise, I take it, is essential to our experience of certain particular
artworks. A good example would be Him by Italian artist Maurizio Catte-
lan. The work functions as such: one enters a room in which the sculpture
6
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of a kneeling boy, seemingly praying, can be seen from behind. As one
moves forward in the room, the face of the child turns out to be that of
... Adolf Hitler’s. This is obviously meant to surprise the spectator and
defeat his expectations. The work also intends to upset one’s common be-
liefs: the presentation of Hitler as a praying child contradicts our general
association of prayer with moral virtue or of Nazism with monstrosity, for
instance. I argue that we have here the case of an artwork that relies on
surprise for its proper functioning: our experience and judgment would
have been altered if the sculpture’s front had been seen right from the
start, or if one had simply seen its back and moved on to another room.
This particular example shows that surprise is central to the functioning of
some artworks, which means that the latter intend to generate this emotion
and that they cannot be experienced in the same way without it.
But couldn’t we go further, and say that surprise is necessary for the
correct functioning of certain kinds of artworks? The point seems obvi-
ous in the case of narratives, as long as they involve (dramatic or comical)
suspense. Here again, surprise is generally part of the work’s proper func-
tioning: a detective novel would lose most of its interest if the identity of
the murderer or the outcome of the story was given away right from the
start. Even when we know how things will end up (fairy tales, tragedies),
we want to see how the events are going to take place, that is, have some
uncertainties about the development of the narrative4. Things should not
be transparent-clear right from the start. When a narrative is too obvious,
it becomes dull. We want, at some point, to face the unexpected5.
The point could also be made in the case of music. Following the
seminal intuitions of Meyer (1956), Huron (2006) has laid the stress on
certain neurological mechanisms involved in the arousal of surprise and
shown that it has an essential relation to other basic emotions (awe, laugh-
4 Huron suggest something similar: “Suppose you had the opportunity to know in
advance all of the future times and places when your most cherished goals or ambitions
would be fulﬁlled. I doubt that many people would want such knowledge. Part of the
joy of life is the surprise that accompanies achieving certain wishes. When all of the
uncertainty is removed, the capacity for pleasure also seems to be diminished” (Huron,
2006, 39)
5 It is worth noting that this idea is not very new: Aristotle says in the Poetics that
tragedy must produce the thaumaston (which means the surprising) by the reversal of the
events (peripeteia) in order to function properly.
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ter, and frisson). What matters for us is his idea that music involves certain
expectation-fulﬁlment or anticipation-disappointment patterns, which
are biologically grounded but also culturally learnt. It is patent that com-
posers have learnt to play with these entrenched norms in diﬀerent ways,
as Huron remarks:
“There are four basic forms of surprise […] A schematic surprise arises
when a commonplace (schematic) event is displaced by an event of
lower probability. Musical examples of such surprises include de-
ceptive cadences and chromatic mediant chords. A dynamic surprise
arises in response to events that have a low probability given the
listener’s encounter with previous passages in that same work thus
far. Musical examples include rhythmic hemiola, and the “surprise”
chord in Haydn’s Surprise Symphony. A veridical surprise arises in re-
sponse to events that have a low probability of occurrence given past
experiences with the work. Musical examples of such surprises in-
clude performance errors, intentional misquotations (such as Schick-
ele’s thematic joking), and unfamiliar interpretive nuances applied to
works that are otherwise highly familiar to a listener. A conscious sur-
prise is a rare form of surprise […] it arises when a knowledgeable
listener consciously infers some future event, which then does not
take place” (2006: 303).
Huron is proposing what we called a qualitative account of (musical) sur-
prises, and we can see that there are many potential ways for musical works
to be surprising. From here, it could certainly be argued that, although mu-
sic need not necessarily surprise us to be pleasant or valuable, it is essential
to its functioning to rely on and sometimes defeat our expectations.
To summarize, entire kinds of artworks rely on the (possible) produc-
tion of surprise to function properly and to be experienced as they should.
We need of course to distinguish the surprise an artwork intends to pro-
duce and the one we actually feel. A work may try to be surprising and
not succeed (and vice versa). But in any case, it seems clear that surprise
plays some role in our experience of the artwork, in the determination
of its qualities or interest, that is, in its value. The argument is then the
following:
(a) The (possible) experience of surprise is necessary to the correct
functioning of some artworks or kinds of artworks.
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(b) When they fail to surprise us, these artworks do not function
correctly.
(c) Correct functioning is signiﬁcant to determine an artwork’s value
(Conclusion) Surprise is therefore signiﬁcant to determine some art-
works’ value.
(ii) I come to my second argument. Is it possible to go further, and to
claim that generally, the higher our surprise, the more grounds we have to
judge of the work’s merits and ﬂaws? That is, can we correlate our level of
surprise with our ascription of value? This idea is promising. Indeed, we
often say of good art that it surprised us one way or another (e.g., in ex-
pressing original ideas, using new techniques or styles) and of bad art that
it failed to do so, being boring, dull, and ordinary. Masterworks are also
generally considered to be the most surprising ones, because they convey
something revolutionary, absolutely new, and irremediably rich. What
about bad surprises, though? Certainly, some artworks can disappoint us,
or shock us in a bad way. Well, even in these cases, surprise still proves to
be correlated with a judgment of value. For instance, if I am disappointed
in my expectation that a novel is going to be great when I read it, it is still
a response to the work, and it is still a ground for judging of its value or
its interest. To be struck by a mismatch or an inconsistency is still a rele-
vant response for aesthetic judgment. Avant-garde works, such as Joyce’s
Ulysses, or Picasso’s Les demoiselles d ’Avignon, often lead to this sort of reac-
tions in the ﬁrst place (“This is not art!”), where the surprise or shock of
the audience was immediately associated with an aesthetic appreciation.
Surprise, then, seems to be a basis for many aesthetic judgements. Once
more, I do not claim that all artworks have to surprise us to have an aes-
thetic value, or that a good artwork should be surprising. I simply hold
that it seems possible to generally correlate the amount of surprise pro-
duced by a work with the intensity of our response to it, and thus with our
judgments of value. The point could be put as such:
(a) The more an artwork surprises us, the stronger is our reaction to
it.
(b) The stronger our reaction is to an artwork, the more ground we
have to determine its value (merits and ﬂaws).
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(Conclusion) The more an artwork surprises us, the more we can
determine its value.
(iii) I come to the last point. There seems to exist a strong link between
surprise and creativity. Indeed, we generally consider creative artists to
be the ones breaking or renewing the established codes and conventions,
proposing something unprecedented, making us think or feel in a new way.
The ability to produce surprise, then, could perhaps be seen as a sign of
artistic mastery or a criterion for creativity. If this is true, it would pro-
vide support for our claim that surprise is signiﬁcant to determine a work’s
aesthetic value. According to Margaret A. Boden (2004), there are several
ways in which the ability to produce surprise is essentially linked to cre-
ativity:
“Creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are
new, surprising and valuable […] An idea may be surprising because
it’s unfamiliar, or even unlikely [...] This sort of surprise goes against
statistics. The second sort of surprise is more interesting. An unex-
pected idea may ‘ﬁt’ into a style of thinking that you already had –
but you’re surprised because you hadn’t realized that this particular
idea was part of it. Maybe you’re even intrigued to ﬁnd that an idea
of this general type ﬁts into the familiar style. And the third sort of
surprise is more interesting still: this is the astonishment you feel on
encountering an apparently impossible idea. It just couldn’t have en-
tered anyone’s head, you feel – and yet it did. It may even engender
other ideas which, yesterday, you’d have thought equally impossible”
(Boden, 2004: 2-3).
For Boden, three kinds of creativity correspond to these three sorts of
surprises. Combinational creativity consists in the association of familiar
ideas or elements in some novel and unfamiliar ways. One can see it at
work in successful analogies and metaphors (think of Eluard’s verse, “La
terre est bleue comme une orange”) or in fusions of styles. Secondly, there
would be the exploratory creativity, in which a familiar “conceptual space”
(i.e. a style of thinking or established practice) is used in some unprece-
dented way. It may consist for instance in the modiﬁcation of an en-
trenched artistic tradition (e.g, Still life with eggplant by Matisse). This
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sort of creativity prompts the reader, spectator, or audience to consider
something that could have been thought of within the familiar conceptual
space, but with an acuity that brings to light new aspects or consequences.
Lastly, transformational creativity consists in some extreme modiﬁcation or
replacement of a whole conceptual space, as when Schönberg decided to
break the traditional laws of occidental harmony, or when perspective was
(re)discovered and theorized in Renaissance Italy. This sort of creativity
is obviously the most impressive one, because it leads to completely un-
expected works or ideas, such as they could not even have been imagined
before. Boden’s account could be discussed further. What matters to us is
the point that creativity often consists in the ability to generate surprises.
This does not imply, once more, that surprise is necessary or suﬃcient
condition for anything: a work may be creative just because it conveys
some minor changes that will generate no strong surprise or no surprise at
all (one can get this feeling when several works of a painter are exhibited in
chronological order, for instance). Surprise may also be provoked by non-
creative works. Still, we should grant that generally, creative works do
surprise us, somehow. Our argument can then be summarized as follows:
(a) Creativity often involves the artist’s ability to surprise.
(b) The creativity of an artwork is a ground for determining its aes-
thetic value.
(Conclusion) Surprise is signiﬁcant for determining a work’s aes-
thetic value.
3. Surprise, Artworks, and Cognitivism
I have tried to show that surprise is a ground for our aesthetic judgements,
that is, for our appreciation of a work’s merits or ﬂaws. We can now come
to our second claim, namely, that a philosophical analysis of surprise sup-
ports aesthetic cognitivism. What I intend to do now is to show that
surprise is not only cognitive in its origins, but fundamentally in its out-
come or consequences. Aesthetic cognitivism, as we said, is the philosophical
view according to which art can produce knowledge or have an impact on
our epistemic life. Cynthia Freeland deﬁnes it more precisely as the thesis
that “(1) Artworks stimulate cognitive activity that may teach us about the
11
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world; (2) The cognitive activity they stimulate is part and parcel of their
functioning as artworks. (3) As a result of this stimulation, we learn from
artworks: we acquire fresh knowledge, our beliefs are reﬁned, and our un-
derstanding is deepened …” (Freeland 1997: 19). Why would an emotion
such as surprise provide support for such a view? The answer, I think, has
already been sketched: being the reaction to a conﬂict between our be-
liefs and reality, it commands a modiﬁcation of our thinking in order to
adjust with the world’s objective state. If I experience a mismatch between
my expectations or beliefs and a current perceptual input (“Wait! Is that a
hedgehog on my couch?”), I can try to verify whether this is really the case.
If, after veriﬁcation, I come to correct the input (“it was just my cat after
all”), the conﬂict is solved; but if the mismatch persists (“I am sure my cat
doesn’t have spikes on his back”), then I am genuinely surprised and I have
either to revise my beliefs or to ﬁnd an explanation to make sense of this
event. Generally, when facing something implausible or unexpected, we
have two options: we can either decide to accept this new fact and con-
sequently change some of our beliefs; or we can stick to our old ideas and
try to ﬁnd an explanation to deny or account for the occurrence of the
surprising event.
Surprise, to sum up, often entails a process of reﬂective equilibrium be-
tween the web of our beliefs and experience, in order to end the state of
epistemic distress or dissonance caused by the surprising event. In any
case, its occurrence tends to initiate some epistemic change. It is worth
noting that such a claim is also found and investigated in evolutionary psy-
chology, where one can understand the belief-change induced by surprise
as a functional, adaptive mechanism:
“One of the adaptive functions of surprise is exactly this. Belief
change in cognitive agents is triggered by very surprising incoming
input. The intensity of surprise relative to the incoming input “sig-
nals” to the agent that things are not going as expected and that the
knowledge of the environment must be reconsidered. Indeed, wrong
beliefs generally lead to bad performances and to failure in the in-
tention and goal fulﬁllment. On the other hand resource bounded
cognitive agents do not generally reconsider their beliefs and expec-
tations when the input data are not recognized to be incompatible or
implausible with respect to their pre-existent knowledge […] When
12
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the world ﬂows as expected and we are not aware of the inadequacy
of our knowledge of the world, we do not need to criticize and re-
consider this knowledge”. [Lorini & Castelfranchi, 2006: 19]
If surprise results from a failure to predict and anticipate the actual course
of events, it is natural to think that it must provoke a modiﬁcation of an
individual’s behaviour and beliefs. But how does all this relate to artworks?
We could argue that many artworks intend to produce such belief revi-
sion, by intentionally frustrating our expectations. A good example would
be the following: Spanish artist Joan Foncuberta produced a series of pho-
tographs called ‘Constelaciones’ (1994). In the ﬁrst place, they seem to be
pictures of the sky, evoking the traditional sublime theme of cosmic im-
mensity. During the exhibition, however, some hints are given to suggest
that something is not quite right. By the end, the spectator just realizes
(or is told) that these pictures are in fact photograms of the artist’s wind-
screen after he drove several hundred kilometres on the highway. All these
stars, comets, planets, and moons, are just insects who met a rather a sad
fate. Here the artist makes one looks at insects in a rather novel way, but
he also questions the audience about the trust they have in museums and
artists (this idea is a constant theme of his work). Here, we can see that
surprise provokes a realization (and a possible revision) of some generally
held beliefs, say, that “insects are gross“, that “artists don’t lie”; or that
“the beauty of the night sky has something unique about it”. The surprise
produced by an artwork, as suggested by this example, can be seen as an
invitation to review or even to revise our beliefs, be it about art in general
or about something else.
Surprise, in the end, proves to be cognitive in its outcome, because it
can impact our thinking. When an artwork (or anything else) surprises us,
we generally seek for an explanation in order resolve the conﬂict -even if
we could also choose a retreat into terror, denial or indiﬀerence. This is
why, following the seminal claims of Nelson Goodman (1968), Israel Schef-
ﬂer has depicted surprise (along with what he calls the “joy of veriﬁcation”)
as a driving force for inquiry and further discoveries:
“Surprise may be dissipated and evaporate into lethargy. It may cul-
minate in confusion or panic. It may be swiftly overcome by dog-
matism. Or it may be transformed into wonder or curiosity, and so
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become an educative occasion. Curiosity replaces the impact of sur-
prise with the demand for explanation; it turns confusion into ques-
tion. To answer the question is to reconstruct initial beliefs so that
they may consistently incorporate what had earlier been unassimil-
able. It is to provide an improved framework of premises by which
the surprising event might have been anticipated and for which par-
allel events will no longer surprise. The constructive conquest of
surprise is registered in the achievement of new explanatory struc-
tures, while cognitive application of these structures provokes sur-
prise once more. Surprise is vanquished by theory, and theory is, in
turn, overcome by surprise […] The growth of cognition is thus, in
fact, inseparable from the education of the emotions”. [Scheﬄer,
2009: 139]
Scheﬄer’s claim, which we will follow here, is rather moderate: although
we cannot claim that all surprises are cognitive or even meaningful, we can
hold that they can (and often do) have an impact on the epistemic life of
the individuals. If we grant this point, and if we recognize that artworks
can surprise us, we consequently have to admit that a surprise produced
by an artwork may lead us to acquire new beliefs or to revise some prior
ones. It entails that aesthetic cognitivism is true. The argument could be
sketched as such:
(a) Surprise only exists relatively to beliefs, expectations, and knowl-
edge.
(b) Surprise urges for belief-change or belief-justiﬁcation.
(c) Artworks can surprise us.
(Conclusion 1) Artworks can induce belief change or new belief jus-
tiﬁcation.
(Conclusion 2) Artworks have a cognitive power.
(Conclusion 3) Aesthetic cognitivism is true.
4. Some Unsurprising Worries
Several general objections could be made to what has been said here. I
want to address the most obvious ones:
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(i) First of all, one could argue that surprise is too context-sensitive and too
loose of a concept to be included in any serious theory. After all, anybody
could be surprised by anything, given diﬀerent situations, and relatively
to one’s prior expectations or beliefs – with the bizarre consequence that
the less you know, the more often you are to be surprised. Moreover, as
we noted, a work may want to be surprising without succeeding at it (or
vice versa) and it seems possible to enjoy or hate very ordinary art. There
would thus seem to be no logical link between the felt surprise and the
work’s purpose or qualities. Surprise could not indicate anything about a
work’s value, unless one considers the latter as being also relative to con-
text and individuals.
(ii) We have said that some surprises are aesthetic, while all of them are
cognitive in their grounding. This could be challenged, since there seem
to be events that would count as surprising without requiring any par-
ticular epistemic or intentional background. In a way, the expectation-
requirement for surprise leads to the implausible idea that one must be
ready to (or have reasons to) be surprised in order to be so. According
to Benoist (2013), following Meyer (1956), we should make a distinction
between the unexpected and the surprising. While the ﬁrst requires some
epistemic framework or expectation to arise, the second does not presup-
pose such a thing. For instance, to be startled by a ﬁrecracker that has
gone oﬀ behind me, or by the loud and sudden cymbal in Haydn’s 94 sym-
phony, does not presuppose any expectation or anticipation, but seems
just a purely emotional and reﬂex reaction. Far from being something un-
expected , the essence of the surprising would amount to what strikes us
when we were not expecting anything at all. We should thus deny that sur-
prise is (always) necessarily linked to belief or knowledge.
(iii) One could eventually object that the correlation of surprise and aes-
thetic value does not work, because it seems that some of our judgments
take place in the long run, after all the eﬀects of surprise are gone. Psy-
chologists have even shown that people are more likely to enjoy works they
are more familiar with, so that presentations in a better-known style or by
a better-known artist induce more positive responses (this is the so-called
‘mere exposure eﬀect’). Habit, thus, would prove as good a candidate as
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novelty in judging of a works’ value.
Are these objections deﬁnitive? We must concede to (i) that surprise is
context-sensitive. Certainly, what surprises one leaves another indiﬀerent,
and it is hard to know in advance what will puzzle whom and why. This is
the reason why, as said in the introduction, a qualitative theory of surprise
seems diﬃcult; it also explains why we cannot say that a work will be good
because it is surprising, or bad because it is not. However, this context-
dependence is not enough to prove that surprise does not play a role in our
evaluation of artworks. It merely shows that surprise could be produced
by any artwork (depending on the contexts and the individuals), but not
that it isn’t relevant for aesthetic judgments. The apparent consequence
that judgments of value would also become relative should not worry us
too much: as we said, talk of aesthetic value is itself controversial, but
taken in a simple sense as we have proposed (where the value refers to the
assumed sum of merits and ﬂaws), its contextuality amounts to the obvious
fact that we do not experience and appreciate artworks in the same way,
depending on our prior history, expertise, and other idiosyncratic factors.
We can therefore say that surprise plays a functional role in the ascription
of value without going further in the philosophical mineﬁeld of aesthetic
values.
As for (ii), whether or not we accept or not the idea of non epistemic
surprises is of no impact for our main thesis. That some surprises might
be non-cognitive in their origin does not entail that none of them are, as
the fact that most surprises are cognitive in their origin does not entail
that they will always prove to be so in their outcome (i.e., by systemati-
cally inducing signiﬁcant belief change). The question of non-epistemic
surprises is worth exploring, but this tasks pertains more to a qualitative
theory than to the functional account we have tried to sketch here.
To the proponent of (iii), we could say that there need not be any con-
ﬂict here. We do not require any unique basis for our aesthetic judgments.
Familiarity and habit can indeed participate in the evaluation of a work’s
value. Maybe it even plays a greater role than we think. But this does not
entail that surprise plays no part or that it should be overlooked. In fact,
it even suggests the contrary, since we saw that surprise presupposes prior
habits and beliefs in order to exist. As Huron puts it, “surprise requires
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an expected outcome; and an expected outcome requires an internalized
norm” (2006: 36). Our aesthetic judgments could thus result from a subtle
alchemy between our habits or personal history and the novelty conveyed
by the artwork.
We have shown that surprise can play an important part in our aes-
thetic judgments and experiences. Even if this claim can be challenged,
surprise is still of interest for philosophical aesthetics, because it func-
tions as a “cognitive emotion”, impacting the epistemic life of individuals.
I have claimed that this provides a strong argument in favor of aesthetic
cognitivism. It might be good to ﬁnish with a remark. From the obvi-
ous fact that distinct individuals have diﬀerent expectations and beliefs at
one time; and that the same individuals have diverse beliefs and expecta-
tions at diﬀerent times; it follows that artworks can produce many kinds
of surprises at various occasions. The changing and dynamic nature of our
epistemic life explains why a work, even familiar, can still startle or amaze
us after some time. We could thus account for the problem of interpre-
tation and also explain what has sometimes been called the irremediably
rich, saturated, and complex nature of artworks. A philosophical analysis
of surprise is perhaps a path towards these other major issues in aesthetics.
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